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Abstract: There has been a marked shift away from social liberalism in many parts of the 
world which has profound ramifications for women, whose status remains contingent on the 
good graces of public institutions that remain resolutely masculinist. Neoliberalism, with its 
focus on the privatisation of public goods and promotion of the self within the market has 
become the dominant political ideology everywhere and is further undermining the interests 
of the majority of women. This essay will address the changing fortunes of sex discrimination 
legislation as a specific example of an initiative designed to improve the status of women. 
Australia will be used as a case study because of its passionate embrace of, first, social 
liberalism, and then, neoliberalism. Issues pertaining to affirmative action (positive action), 
intersection with human rights instruments, reporting requirements and incentives will also 
be addressed. Although Australia is a multi-jurisdictional federation, the essay will focus 
primarily on the federal arena in terms of legislative initiatives, policy and jurisprudence. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that discrimination on the ground of sex might be considered unlawful was unknown to the 
common law. Indeed, the common law played a prominent role for hundreds of years in entrenching 
discrimination against women in all spheres of life. Women were largely excluded from the public sphere 
and denied access to universities, the professions and the governance of the state. This allusion to the 
common law highlights the novelty of the non-discrimination principle and the resistance to overcoming 
gender inequalities buried deep within the social psyche. 
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Indeed, it is anomalous that law might be regarded as an instrument of liberation for women at all 
when such a short time ago it was an instrument of oppression. Such is the liberal faith in the neutrality 
of law, however, that we are prepared to ignore its seemingly duplicitous character, underscored by the 
fact that the key institutions of legality were populated entirely by men for centuries. Women had to 
approach men in power as supplicants, begging for enfranchisement, as well as admission to universities 
and the professions. Wendy Brown suggests that the idea of women seeking protection from masculinist 
institutions against men is more in keeping with feudalism than freedom ([1], p. 170). Nevertheless, in 
order to maintain its legitimacy, the liberal state must appear to be fair ([2], p. 184). The enactment of 
sex discrimination is one such initiative that gives the appearance of fairness while thinly disguising the 
play of power beneath the surface. 
In this essay, I am interested in disinterring the ideological shifts and turns of power in the case of 
sex discrimination legislation. I draw on the Australian experience as a case study because Australia was 
remarkably receptive to social liberalism, which gave rise to anti-discrimination legislation but was soon 
equally passionate in its embrace of neoliberalism. An examination of the recent trajectory of sex 
discrimination legislation, primarily at the federal level, highlights how the fortunes of women continue 
to be closely imbricated with the political mood of the day. 
In making the argument, I overview the genesis of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SDA), the 
inequality of bargaining power in the lodgment of complaints, the operation of indirect discrimination 
arising from work/life balance at the appellate level and selective dimensions of the contemporary 
jurisprudence in relation to corporeality and care. In this regard, I briefly address the political trends in 
reported decisions over the 5-year period 2009–2014 in regard to the attributes of pregnancy, caring 
responsibilities and sexual harassment. I also consider the fortunes of affirmative action (AA) legislation, 
as well as a number of other ill-fated initiatives designed to overcome the limitations of the SDA and 
effect substantive equality. The historical detail and doctrinal analysis are beyond the scope of the article 
and can be pursued elsewhere [3–6]. 
2. From Social Liberalism to Neoliberalism 
While it is not disputed that the status of women has changed dramatically over the last century, one 
should be wary of too readily adopting a liberal progressivist thesis in which it is accepted that society 
is moving inexorably towards an ideal end state where equality between men and women is a reality. 
As freedom and equality are the twin variables of liberal political theory, equality needs to be 
considered in the context of its symbiotic relationship with freedom, a relationship in which there is  
a constant tension. Indeed, as Wendy Brown points out, liberalism produces a Nietzschean notion of 
ressentiment (a desire to retaliate by inflicting pain) [7] because it simultaneously promises both freedom 
and equality ([1], p. 67. Cf. [8], pp. 21‒27). When equality is in the ascendancy, as manifest in social 
liberalism, it provokes ressentiment on the part of conservatives who feel that their freedom has been 
attenuated. Conversely, when freedom triumphs, as manifest in neoliberalism, the commitment to 
equality is minimised and the ressentiment of progressives is ignited. The experience of sex discrimination 
legislation illustrates well the attack on equality by conservatives, whose demands for freedom became 
more and more vociferous, as I will show. 
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Social liberalism, or Post-War Keynesianism, was an iteration of liberalism commonly associated 
with democratic regimes in the West, particularly the UK, Canada and Australasia, in which a concern 
for the common good and wellbeing of the community as a whole was in evidence. There was a degree 
of cooperation between the primary stakeholders—government, employer and employee groups—to 
shape policy, illustrated by a formal co-operative arrangement that was known as “the Accord” in 
Australia (1983–1991) ([9], pp. 5–8). In free market economies, one of the responsibilities of the social 
liberal state is to restrain the untrammelled freedom of the market through regulation. Distributive justice 
is effected by the state through progressive taxation and welfare policies. Equal opportunity (EO) is also 
the responsibility of the state because, as Marian Sawer points out, markets are incapable of delivering 
EO ([10], p. 365). It is this key role of the state in mitigating inequality to which conservatives objected 
in the latter part of the 20th century because, they claimed, it constrained their freedom. The ressentiment 
of the right manifested itself in the policies of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and George Bush Snr. in the 
US. They began to cut welfare and privilege the market, which engendered the rise of the new ideology. 
In Australia, the neoliberal turn caused the Accord to break down. 
Neoliberalism defies a precise definition as it lacks not only a manifesto but a systematic set of ideas. 
It is nevertheless associated with certain “dogmas” which are succinctly summarised by Peter Self: 
The high importance attached to market-led economic growth; the value of complete free 
trade in money and capital as well as in goods and services; the need to subordinate social 
welfare to market requirements; the belief in cutting down or privatising government 
functions; the acceptability of profit as a test of economic welfare…([11], p. ix). 
Within neoliberal discourse, the market is depicted as intrinsically more efficient than government 
and a trade-off between equality and efficiency is assumed. Equality, then, comes to be associated  
with government and “inefficiency”, a conjunction that does not bode well for equality initiatives, as  
I will demonstrate. 
Neoliberal ideology also endeavours to link the market to democracy, taking its cue from Milton 
Friedman, an early proponent of neoliberalism: “economic freedom is…an indispensable means towards 
the achievement of political freedom” ([12], p. 8). The pre-eminence of the market caused civil society 
to contract in such a way as to become “neoliberalized” ([13], p. 2). As the market assumes centre-stage, 
the social co-operation weakens “and the impulse to a selfish or self-protective form of individualism 
grows” ([11], p. 97). 
Neoliberalism is redolent of the neoclassical economic position in which the market is viewed as 
superior to state command; the functions of the state are then limited to protecting citizens against 
violence, theft and fraud ([14], p. 26). Despite the commitment to small government, which has seen the 
state resile from a commitment to social justice and equity, the neoliberal state transcends the 
neoclassical liberal state by virtue of its intimate relationship with the market and its obsessive concern 
with capital accumulation and the “good of the economy”. 
The neoliberal turn has profound ramifications for the implementation of the non-discrimination 
principle, particularly in regard to employment, where the preponderance of discrimination complaints 
arise ([15], p. 124). Neoliberalism has induced a marked resiling from workers’ rights in favour of 
employer prerogative in accordance with the economic imperatives in vogue. This has led to the 
transformation of the nature of work, including its intensification ([16], p. 5), and the erosion of working 
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conditions, such as the casualisation of labour, which has profoundly impacted on women [17]. 
Nevertheless, as the conditions of work have deteriorated for all workers, anti-discrimination legislation, 
as presently conceptualised, is incapable of providing a remedy either on the basis of sex or other 
characteristic of identity. In order for the legislative schema to maintain its legitimacy, what we see 
instead is an increased focus on corporeality and care as systemic sex discrimination becomes normalised 
once more. Within the context of neoliberalism, where the emphasis is on productivity, performativity 
and profits, the focus on equity and social justice has become virtually ineffable. 
3. Legislating against Sex Discrimination 
Australian Labor Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam (1972–1925), is a key figure associated with the 
high point of social liberalism. He sought to modernise the nation state by means of a body of social 
liberal and distributive justice reforms, including no-fault divorce, free higher education, rights for 
Aboriginal people and the implementation of the non-discrimination principle. The National and State 
Committees on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, which preceded the enactment of 
legislation, were set up in 1973 following ratification of ILO 111. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth) (RDA) was enacted soon afterwards, but federal sex discrimination legislation could not be enacted 
without a constitutional basis, and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) was not adopted until the end of the decade [18]. 
Nevertheless, by the early 1970s, feminism had become an important force for change and feminist 
advisors became de rigueur within the bureaucracy ([19], pp. 21–25). In fact, the “femocrat” was an 
Australian neologism that was coined to describe the feminist bureaucrat, and Gough Whitlam was 
responsible for the appointment of the first women’s advisor to government in 1973. Ironically, however, 
Whitlam cut tariffs on imports by 25 per cent ([20], p. 89), an action that presaged the neoliberal turn, 
thereby putting paid to the idea that there is a clear line of demarcation between social liberalism  
and neoliberalism. 
While sex discrimination was proscribed by several Australian States in the 1970s—South Australia [21], 
Victoria [22] and New South Wales [23]—the national level proved to be more controversial. The 
passage of the SDA in 1983–1984 was accompanied by a protracted and sometimes hysterical debate in 
federal Parliament, which revealed a deep anxiety about sex roles, the patriarchal family and the 
wellbeing of children [24]. At the time, only six of the 125 members of the House of Representatives 
and 13 of the 64 members of the Senate were women, underscoring how women had to rely on the good 
graces of male parliamentarians to effect social change beneficial for women. The support of the 
incoming Labor Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, was therefore crucial and the SDA was passed with 
bipartisan support even though thousands of petitions were marshalled against it [25]. 
Despite the hysteria surrounding the SDA, it was a modest, individual complaint-based piece of 
legislation that applied to men as well as women, unlike CEDAW, which is sex-specific. The SDA 
proscribed discrimination on the grounds of sex, marital status and pregnancy although a number of 
other attributes were added subsequently, namely, family responsibilities (1992), potential pregnancy 
(1995), breastfeeding (2011) and sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex (2013). The ambit of 
operation is restricted to areas of public or quasi-public life, including employment, education, goods 
and services, accommodation, land and clubs. Sexual harassment was expressly proscribed from the 
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outset, but only in employment. In accordance with the liberal paradigm, private life was largely  
off-limits, although the strict line of demarcation between public and private life was challenged by the 
inclusion of sexual harassment and the more recent grounds. As sexuality is regarded as paradigmatically 
private within liberal legalism, the proscription of discrimination on the grounds of sexual harassment 
and sexual orientation in the public sphere involved a new way of understanding these characteristics. 
The conservative critics of the bill, including the oddly named anti-feminist group, the Women Who 
Want to be Women (WWWW), had sought to retain the conventional liberal legal line of demarcation 
between public and private life, arguing that, if passed, the legislation would bring about the breakdown 
of the family unit [26]. While the WWWW were unsuccessful in preventing passage of the bill, a number 
of exemptions were included that acceded to traditional values, such as single sex schools and clubs, and 
occupations where sex was a “genuine occupational qualification”, such as authenticity in a dramatic 
performance or where decency might be required in the fitting of clothes or the conduct of body searches. 
The opponents of the bill were also successful in securing a religious exemption regarding employment 
and education. This permitted discrimination in the case of conduct carried out in “good faith in order to 
avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of [a] religion or creed” (SDA, s. 38). Although 
discrimination on the ground of religious belief is not proscribed under federal legislation, unlike most 
State and territory jurisdictions, the exemption in the SDA accords religious organisations a privileged 
status de facto. The exemption privileges not only overtly patriarchal practices, such as the ordination of 
male priests and rabbis, it also exempts educational institutions run by religious organisations. This 
allows them to refuse employment to a lay person (such as a teacher or clerk, for example) because of 
their sex, marital status, pregnancy or sexual orientation if it would cause injury to others by virtue of 
their “religious susceptibilities”. It is notable that this exemption does not apply to cognate legislation 
relating to race, disability or age. Although few complaints have proceeded to public hearing to test the 
nexus between non-discriminatory employment and “injury to religious susceptibilities” [27], the 
exemption is an example of a status-enforcing mechanism that perpetuates women’s inequality [28,29]. 
Despite the exemptions (together with Australia’s reservations to CEDAW in respect of combat  
duties and paid maternity leave) [30], the rhetoric of equal employment opportunity (EEO) assumed  
a prominent status in public discourse following the passage of the SDA. At the high point of social 
liberalism, corporations began to include statements in their advertisements that they were EEO 
employers and annual awards were offered to exemplary performers. For a fleeting moment, they were 
anxious to show that they had sloughed off pre-modern patriarchal practices and were welcoming of 
women. The official commitment by the state towards EEO was nevertheless simultaneously being 
undermined by the rise of neoliberalism, particularly the sense that the market was the pre-eminent good 
and equality was antipathetic to efficiency. 
It is clear at the outset that there was a significant disjuncture between the SDA and the realisation of 
equality. A framework for the lodgment of individual complaints within specified areas of public life 
that were subject to significant exemptions fell far short of the means of effecting substantive equality 
for women, as I will demonstrate.  
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4. The Body of Jurisprudence 
4.1. Inequality of Bargaining Power 
Conciliation is the primary mode of dispute resolution under the SDA, which is dealt with 
confidentially behind closed doors ([6], pp. 143–70; [31,32]. Conciliation undoubtedly has positive 
dimensions: it is cheap and expeditious; it endows complainants with voice and it acknowledges the 
emotional harm they might have suffered as a result of discrimination, but it does not overcome the 
power imbalance between them and respondents. The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), 
which undertakes the role of conciliator under the SDA, is expected to act impartially, not to play a role 
in counterbalancing the power of the respondent on behalf of a complainant ([33], p. 919). 
Only if conciliation is unsuccessful may a complaint proceed to a tribunal or court hearing, but less 
than two per cent of complaints do so. As formal hearings are held in public and necessitate the adduction 
of reasons, they are of valuable precedential value. Nevertheless, formal hearings before either the 
Federal Circuit Court or the Federal Court of Australia involve a risk for individual complainants as 
losing a case is likely to mean having to pay the respondent’s costs as well as their own. In the case of 
State and territory tribunals, the norm is that each party is responsible for their own costs—a principle 
that is difficult to reverse—and a successful complainant may find that their costs exceed the modest 
damages awarded [34]. 
Furthermore, it is notable that respondents are invariably corporate entities, a factor that accentuates 
the inequality of bargaining power between the parties, particularly at the appellate level. Indeed, it is 
startling to observe that the anti-discrimination complaints which have proceeded to the most authoritative 
courts, including the High Court of Australia, have been initiated by some of the country’s most powerful 
corporations as appellants [35]. It is therefore apparent that the structural inequality between the parties 
has assisted in the neoliberal aim of restoring power to capital. Also attesting to the role of the state in 
sustaining neoliberalism is the fact that governments themselves are habitual respondents, in which case 
their appellate status places them in the invidious position of undermining their own legislation in the 
adversarial cut and thrust of litigation, thereby underscoring one of the fundamental contradictions of 
liberal legalism. 
As with conciliation, there is little attempt to balance the scales of justice within the formal judicial 
arena despite the rhetoric of equality before the law. There is no legal aid at the federal level and even 
in the case of State legislation, it is rarely accessible [36]. In Ansett v Wardley [37], for example, the 
respondent who had been denied an application to become a trainee pilot on the ground of sex, was 
supported by the fund-raising efforts of women’s groups. In Banovic [38], the unemployed complainants 
unsuccessfully applied for legal aid on four separate occasions before receiving financial assistance from 
the Premier of New South Wales to be legally represented before the High Court where their former 
employer (a subsidiary of Australia’s largest company) was appealing a decision in their favour. In the 
Commonwealth Bank case [39], which involved Australia’s largest bank, the female complainants were 
unable to appeal to the High Court when their union declined to support them because of fear that  
a conflict of interest would arise with its male members. Schou [40] was run pro bono for the complainant 
by a law firm which was prepared to run an appeal to the High Court provided that the respondent State 
of Victoria gave an undertaking not to sue for costs, but it declined to do so and the case lapsed. 
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There is no provision for the federal agency, the AHRC, to institute litigation on its own motion. The 
high level of abstraction associated with superior courts, such as constitutionalisation, has the effect of 
sloughing off the merits of a complaint in a way that favours respondents [41]. These structural 
inequalities in the administration of justice have been accentuated by the neoliberal turn which has 
boosted the power of corporate respondents further, as I will demonstrate. The net effect is that it enables 
those with power to write sex discrimination jurisprudence from their own perspective, just as the history 
of war is written by the victors. 
4.2. Sex Discrimination 
While many of the initial complaints of sex discrimination related to questions of “letting in” were 
successful, such as women wishing to become airline pilots [37], the focus of the regulatory discourse 
is now on the interconnectedness of work and life [42]. Pregnancy, family responsibilities, sexual harassment 
and sex discrimination in employment more generally generate 83 per cent of sex discrimination 
complaints under the SDA ([15], pp. 135–36). Pregnancy, family responsibilities and sexual harassment 
complaints commonly appear as the primary ground, the preponderance of which are based on direct 
discrimination. Sex discrimination has nevertheless been the basis for a small number of significant 
complaints based on indirect discrimination, which involves a practice that is neutral on its face but 
exercises a disproportionate impact on one sex. There is a materiality associated with pregnancy, family 
responsibilities and sexual harassment which renders these grounds more tractable to remediation than 
indirect discrimination. While the latter ostensibly lends itself to challenging many established workplace 
practices, the unencumbered worker model at the heart of these practices remains resistant to change [43]. 
For example, Amery (2006) [44] involved a group of casual high school teachers who alleged that 
they were subject to sex discrimination as they were paid less than those on the permanent scale, even 
though they performed the same work. To satisfy the permanency scale, the women would have had to 
have been prepared to accept a posting anywhere in the State. The gravamen of the case was that women 
gave precedence to the needs of their families, in accordance with the well-entrenched social norm, and 
declined to move. The relocation requirement arguably amounted to indirect discrimination on the 
ground of sex as it impacted disproportionately on them. However, the majority judges of the High Court 
were dismissive of the idea that the casual and the permanent scales could be compared and found for 
the State of New South Wales. They took no cognisance of the historic discrimination against women or 
the social norms that placed pressure on them to give precedence to the needs of their families. In 
contrast, Kirby J (the sole dissenting judge) was critical of the “narrow and antagonistic” stance  
adopted by the majority judges that paid scant attention to the beneficial and purposive intent of the 
legislation ([44], p. 230; [45]). 
The complex test for indirect discrimination invites the sort of strict legalism that typifies appellate 
decisions. The result is that the employment contract, in which the unencumbered worker has been the 
traditional norm, is privileged over the worker with family responsibilities [46]. It means that the 
systemic sex discrimination that harks back to the days when married women lacked any vestige of 
independence is not cognisable by discrimination law, and justice is accorded short shrift. A number of 
other appellate decisions based on indirect discrimination, also involving powerful respondents and 
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women with family responsibilities, have been decided in favour of respondents when courts have 
similarly deferred to managerial prerogative. 
The Commonwealth Bank case (1997) [39] involved a major redundancy and restructuring exercise, 
which is a familiar neoliberal phenomenon that is conducted with the aim of effecting workplace 
efficiency. The case was run on behalf of more than 100 female employees who argued that the 
restructure disproportionately impacted on them as they were denied access to a redundancy package 
when they were on family leave, including maternity leave. The Federal Court held that the approach of 
the bank was “reasonable”, a “catch-all” test commonly found in indirect discrimination provisions that 
purports to be objective but may in fact privilege the standpoint of the employer. 
Schou (2004) [40], which was initiated under the Victorian legislation involved a woman with caring 
responsibilities who wished to work flexibly. Once again, the respondent was a powerful entity, the State 
of Victoria (Department of Parliamentary Debates). The complainant had a chronically ill child and 
sought to do her transcription work at home for two days per week when Parliament was sitting, which 
was easily managed with the available technology. However, both the single judge and the Full Bench 
of the Victorian Supreme Court held that the reasonableness provision should have been directed to the 
attendance requirement. That is, if the employer specifies attendance at a place of work, employer 
prerogative should prevail. This was despite the fact that the option of flexible work had been initially 
agreed to by the respondent. Consideration of alternatives that might accord with the non-discrimination 
principle was given short shrift. 
Thus, we see not only a restrictive and positivistic interpretation of anti-discrimination legislation in 
which employer prerogative prevails over the spirit of the legislation, but instances when governments 
are prepared to undermine their own legislation by appealing decisions in favour of complainants as we 
see in the cases of Amery and Schou. These cases show how neoliberal values favouring employer 
prerogative have seeped into the judicial mindset and overshadowed the ostensibly egalitarian aims of 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
As I argued in The Liberal Promise 25 years ago, instances of discrimination cognisable within the 
legislation are those closest to the surface [6] These are typically instances of direct discrimination; there 
are few successful indirect discrimination claims ([47], p. 113). Indeed, the only successful indirect 
discrimination complaint on the ground of sex decided by the High Court was Banovic [38] in 1989 at  
a time when social liberalism was in the ascendancy [35]. Amery (2006) [44], the next sex discrimination 
case and the most recent to be heard, was also based on indirect discrimination but it is in sharp contrast 
to Banovic, both in style and outcome. Gone is the notion of anti-discrimination legislation as beneficial 
legislation designed to effect gender equality in favour of a formalism that accords with employer 
prerogative. To illustrate the neoliberal influence that tends to favour employers in this jurisdiction, I 
now turn to a consideration of recent complaints 2009–2014, dealing with pregnancy, family 
responsibilities and sexual harassment, all based on direct discrimination and generally dealt with by 
lower courts in the first instance. 
4.3. Pregnancy 
Although discrimination on the ground of pregnancy was included in the SDA from the outset and in 
State legislation for a decade before that, as well as being the subject of thoroughgoing campaigns and 
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reports [48], pregnancy continues to be a common source of discrimination against women at work. 
Employers fear that women will transfer their loyalty from the workplace to their families, cost them 
money as a result of frequent absences and no longer be productive employees. A stereotype that is hard 
to shake off is that working mothers trade competence for warmth. Psychological studies have shown 
that while pregnant women are liked, they are not wanted in the workplace ([49], p. 711). Thus, while 
managers may congratulate women when learning of the pregnancy, their attitude quickly changes to 
one of animosity. 
The reported decisions follow a typical pattern in which the complainant is progressing well in her 
job until she informs her employer that she is pregnant. She suddenly finds that she has been downgraded 
and subjected to hostile treatment, culminating in dismissal, which may also result from victimisation 
for lodging a complaint [50]. While employers frequently claim that the demotion or dismissal ensued 
from substandard work, this is unlikely to be accepted if the quality of the work issues arose only after 
announcement of the pregnancy. What is notable in view of the neoliberal turn, however, is that when  
a restructuring of the business is adduced as a reason for redundancy, it is not regarded as pretextual but 
accepted by courts as bona fide [51–54]. The familiarity of restructuring in a neoliberal climate renders 
it virtually impossible for a complainant to refute the respondent’s evidence of business necessity. 
As well as having the option of lodging a complaint under the SDA or State anti-discrimination 
legislation, a complainant may also lodge a complaint under s. 351 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) 
alleging adverse action against her by the employer for affecting her ability to exercise a workplace right. 
This avenue allows a pecuniary penalty to be imposed on the employer, which may be paid to the 
complainant in addition to damages [55]. It is an appealing avenue of complaint for women at work in 
respect of pregnancy and family responsibilities, as it includes a reverse onus of proof, discretionary 
compensation powers and the ability to impose a fine. 
Damages, including economic loss and penalties, awarded in pregnancy discriminatory cases are 
nevertheless generally modest, regardless of jurisdiction. For example, in Stern [56], a paradigmatic 
pregnancy discrimination complaint, the employment status of the complaint was downgraded after she 
became pregnant; she was then bullied and humiliated and made redundant. However, her damages were 
less than AUD7000, including AUD3000 for loss of employment status and a mere AUD800 for 
emotional distress. There is nothing comparable in Australia to the USD186 million (including USD185 
million in punitive damages) awarded to a pregnant woman in the US for a similar case involving the 
familiar pattern of demotion, harassment and dismissal [57], although this decision is likely to be appealed. 
4.4. Family Responsibilities 
Balancing work and family has been described as “the topic of the 21st Century for families, 
employers and government” ([58], p. xi). While there may well be greater receptivity to the ground of 
family responsibilities in contemporary discourse, flexible work continues to be resisted by many 
employers who all too often insist on full-time work in situ, as seen in the case of Schou [40]. Women 
may find that they are subjected to discrimination when they return to work from maternity leave or 
when they seek to work flexibly or adjust their hours. A direct collision arises between women’s rights 
at work and employer prerogative and, as with pregnancy discrimination, demotion and/or dismissal is 
common [59–61]. 
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An unreasonable refusal of a request to agree to leave of absence, part-time or flexible work  
on the basis of family responsibilities may constitute adverse action under the Fair Work Act [62,63].  
In Wilkie [64], an employee sought to advise her employer that she needed to leave work early the 
following day to collect her son from school. She had a right under the Fair Work Act to take 
personal/carer’s leave due to an unexpected emergency. However, she was issued with a warning letter, 
demoted, transferred and finally dismissed. The fact that she was pregnant at the time and would have 
had difficulty in obtaining another position was taken into account in assessing damages at AUD32,000. 
While the overwhelming preponderance of complaints dealing with care and corporeality involve 
female complainants, complaints arising from family responsibilities are now being lodged by men 
alleging adverse action. In Wolfe [65], for example, the employee was an associate director of the 
respondent bank and took four months off to care for his family. Shortly after his return, he was retrenched 
following a restructure. His position and that of another director were merged and W was told on the 
day of his return that the other employee was the preferred candidate, even though W had been given no 
opportunity to apply for the position. The court found for the bank, although it was critical of the lack of 
transparency. Whether the restructuring exercise against W amounted to adverse action for having taken 
family leave cannot be unequivocally established. However, research has shown that a “femininity 
stigma” attaches to men who engage in caring which can lead to organisational punishment, such as 
being demoted or dismissed [66]. This reality does not portend well for the feminist hope that equality 
for women at work is predicated on the assumption that men will assume an equal role in parenting. 
4.5. Sexual Harassment 
More than 20 per cent of sex discrimination complaints arise from the ground of sexual  
harassment ([15], p. 135). A wide variety of conduct is involved, including the creation of a hostile 
working environment [67,68], and the conduct is invariably heterosexed, involving a male harasser and 
a female target. This conforms to the typical masculinist understanding of sexual conduct [69], and such 
complaints have a relatively high chance of success ([47], pp. 112–13). In the paradigmatic case, when 
the woman rejects an overture for sexual favours, she is subjected to adverse treatment, such as 
complaints about her work ethic and job performance [70,71], followed by dismissal [72,73]. The pattern 
is therefore similar to that found in complaints of pregnancy and family responsibilities. Dismissal may 
also result from victimisation for lodging a formal complaint [74]. 
The SDA, like anti-discrimination legislation more generally invests the tribunal or court with wide 
discretion to make an order to restore the complainant to the position she would have been in but for the 
discriminatory act. The most common remedy and the simplest for a court to administer in the case of 
sexual harassment is to order the payment of damages to redress any loss suffered. However, the 
damages awarded in sex discrimination cases, including sexual harassment have been unduly low, as 
with pregnancy discrimination, and it is only recently that there has been a change of heart. 
The facts in Richardson v Oracle [75] were unremarkable in terms of the unwanted sexual overtures 
and humiliating put-downs of the female complainant by a male co-worker. What was unusual was that, 
first, the complainant had been successful in the primary hearing before a single judge and, secondly, it 
was she, not the respondent, who appealed that decision, although the settlement offer she had been 
made would have left her significantly out of pocket in terms of legal costs [76]. Accordingly, this 
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initiative enabled her rather than the corporate respondent to rewrite the sexual harassment jurisprudence 
on damages. Kenny J reviewed the history of damages awards in sexual harassment cases and found that 
damages had been set at a disproportionately low level from the time the legislation came into operation; 
this was usually between ten and twenty thousand dollars. She compared the non-pecuniary damages in 
sexual harassment cases with other areas, such as workplace bullying (mentioned below), where 
substantial damages were awarded as compensation for comparable psychological injury and distress. 
The judge, with whom her fellow judges, Besanko and Perram JJ, agreed, held that the initial award of 
AUD18,000 was “manifestly inadequate as compensation for the damage suffered by the victim, judged 
by reference to prevailing community standards” ([75], para. 109) and the damages were increased to 
AUD130,000. In another case soon afterwards, the Full Court upheld the payment of AUD110,000 in 
general damages, although the facts were extreme and included sexual assault [77]. 
However, if the harassment is not overtly sexualised, albeit sexed, it may not qualify as sexual 
harassment, as with instances of abusive and demeaning language and minor assaults associated with 
managerialism, such as poking the complainant in the “chest” and telling her to do what she is told [78]. 
Neoliberalism has encouraged the development of a more aggressive style of managerialism which may 
make it harder to tell the difference between harassment and management. As Finn J points out, “it is 
not workplace harassment for managers to manage” ([79], p. 56). 
Nevertheless, it is notable that women who have been subjected to bullying in the workplace have 
secured substantial damages by using tort law as their avenue of redress. They have alleged that the 
employer has failed to provide a safe workplace and the bullying has resulted in significant psychiatric 
injury. In Swan [80], damages of almost AUD600,000, including AUD300,000 for pain and suffering, 
were awarded to the plaintiff who had been subjected to sustained bullying by her manager over  
a number of years. The plaintiff in Keegan [81] was awarded AUD238,000 when the court found that 
her life had been “shattered by her employer’s breach” when she was subjected to bullying by her 
manager after returning from maternity leave, even though she worked for only eleven days. While not 
wishing to detract from the harm suffered by the plaintiff in this case, it does stand in sharp contrast to 
the paltry sums co nventionally awarded for sexual harassment (at least prior to Richardson [75]), as 
well as for discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and family responsibility. 
While bullying in the workplace became formally cognisable under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in 
2014, the gendered dynamics of managerialism remain elusive within anti-discrimination legislation. 
There was only one reported sexual harassment decision where the adverse action was alleged to be  
a redundancy resulting from restructuring. In Shea [82], the complainant was a director of corporate 
affairs with the respondent and the only female member of the executive management team. Her 
complaint of harassment was against another senior employee, the Chief Financial Officer. She received 
an ex gratia payment but was made redundant as a result of the restructure soon afterwards as she did 
not wish to continue working with the Chief Financial Officer. Again, it is impossible to ascertain 
whether a restructure was bona fide or whether the company decided that it was convenient to remove a 
“complaining woman”. It does not appear that the harasser was subjected to any detriment, although a 
number of other decisions deal with the dismissal of harassers [83–85]. 
Although the reporting rate remains low ([86], p. 3), there would seem to be a greater willingness to 
acknowledge sexual harassment compared with sex discrimination in the workplace, which could be 
attributed to the fact that sexual harassment does not depend on showing a reason for acting, but merely 
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establishing that the unacceptable conduct took place as Gaze suggests ([33], p. 917). The alacrity of the 
state to act may also arise from the fact that sexualised conduct has the potential to detract from 
productivity in the workplace [87], which may partially explain the willingness to increase damages. 
5. Proactive Legislation 
It is generally agreed that AA or positive action at the institutional level is a more effective mechanism 
for realising gender equality than an individual ad hoc complaint-based regime that is dependent on the 
occasional heroic complainant being prepared to embark on the risky process of suing a corporate 
respondent. Instead of addressing instances of discrimination retrospectively, AA involves institutional 
measures designed to foreclose the occurrence of future harms. I trace the volatile course of federal AA 
legislation in which the neoliberal swing can be clearly discerned. 
As a result of the furore associated with the initial sex discrimination bill, the draft provisions 
concerning AA were removed and subsequently enacted as the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for 
Women) Act 1986 (Cth) (AAA). From the outset, this was an extremely timid piece of legislation in 
which the language of quotas was eschewed in favour of “objectives” and “forward estimates” ([6],  
pp. 227–32). As with the SDA, exaggerated claims about the effects of the AAA had been made 
beforehand, such as necessitating the appointment of “unqualified women” on the basis of biology alone. 
Hence, the AAA contained an express provision that the merit principle would not be compromised. 
The Act required all private and some public organisations with more than 100 employees to develop 
and implement an AA plan involving the institution of “appropriate action” as the organisation thought 
fit. The Act did not mandate any gender-specific measures; the only formal requirement was that an 
annual report be lodged with the AA Agency, although there was no evidence that the Agency checked 
the validity of the information appearing in the reports or followed up on them [88]. The only sanction 
for failing to lodge a report was to be named in the Agency’s annual report which was tabled  
in Parliament. Contract compliance was introduced but it does not appear that it was ever invoked  
against a transgressor. The Act conferred no right to institute legal action, which means that it generated 
no jurisprudence. 
Despite its toothless nature, the AAA was trenchantly attacked during its lifetime by detractors who 
averred that it constituted a form of improper preference, or “reverse discrimination” [89] against men 
who were reduced to “victims” [90,91]. What we see here is evidence of a backlash against women as 
they move from the private sphere into the public sphere and challenge the masculine monopoly over 
professional employment. The sustained criticism of the AAA by conservatives and employer groups 
resulted in its repeal in 1999. It was replaced by another Act that was similar in form but even weaker. 
This was the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth) (EOWWA). Most 
significantly, the language of AA was jettisoned altogether and disappeared overnight from the public 
record. References to “objectives” and “forward estimates” were also removed out of fear that they might 
be confused with quotas. In deference to the objections of employer groups that annual reporting 
constituted an impost on business, this could now be waived in favour of triennial reporting. 
As equality, equity and social justice receded from public discourse, there was also an attempt to 
remove the phrase “Equal Opportunity” from the title of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission in 2003. Although the bill lapsed, the name was changed to the Australian Human Rights 
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Commission in 2008. EO units too began to disappear from workplaces during the 1990s [92]. The 
anodyne concept of diversity or, more precisely, “managing diversity”, began to supplant the rhetoric of 
equality and EEO [93]. “Diversity” appealed because it is a depoliticised term, unlike equality or its 
antonym, inequality. The change of language sought to persuade society that gender discrimination no 
longer existed as equality had been attained. Thus, conservative Prime Minister, John Howard, was able 
to claim confidently at the millennial turn that we now live in a “post-feminist” age ([94], p. 21). 
The modest replacement piece of pro-active legislation of 1999, however, was short-lived, for it too 
was repealed and replaced with the Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth) (WGEA). Reflecting  
the neoliberal turn, the WGEA specifically includes productivity and competitiveness as objects of  
the Act [95,96]. It also dispenses with the gender-specific word “women”—as is apparent from the 
title—in favour of gender neutrality. Nevertheless, a positive development on this occasion was the 
report prepared by the Australian Senate to assist with the drafting of the new legislation, for it stressed 
the inadequacy of AA legislation to date [97]. The report pointed to the irrefutable evidence of the 
continuing inequality for women in the workplace as revealed by the gender pay gap, the minuscule 
number of women in senior management and the ongoing problems confronting workers with family 
responsibilities. This was the first time that it had been officially acknowledged that a softly-softly 
approach dependent on voluntary employer action was inadequate. Nevertheless, sustained opposition 
from both the industry lobby and the conservative Coalition Members of Parliament meant that the 
reluctance to impose sanctions remained. Like a mantra, opponents continued to reiterate their concerns 
about the impact of increasing “red tape” on small business. The bill was passed by a narrow majority 
but, shortly after it became law, a Coalition Government once more assumed office and sought to water 
it down by reducing the reporting requirements [98]. This led to a further period of consultation in  
2014 [99], in response to which the Minister for Employment and the Minister Assisting the Prime 
Minister for Women announced a further reduction in reporting requirements in early 2015 [100]. 
An additional linguistic shift that places work and family at the centre is also discernible as we  
now find that “choice”, “flexibility” and “work/life balance” have largely replaced the earlier EEO 
discourses ([101], p. 534). This language suited the neoconservative morality that goes hand-in-glove 
with neoliberalism and is not restricted to the more conservative side of politics. 
This short but volatile history of AA, or positive action, highlights the impact of the neoliberal turn 
on women’s quest for equality at work. It clearly points to the pendulum swing from equality for women 
in favour of freedom for employers to maximise their returns from labour. 
6. The Triumph of Freedom over Equality 
It is apparent that structural deficiencies have existed in sex discrimination legislation from the  
outset to limit its efficacy. While sex, race, disability and age are treated as discrete by virtue of the 
separate federal Acts, the reality is that sex is invariably complicated by the existence of the other 
characteristics ([102], p. 441). Age plus sex, for example, is particularly problematic for women ([103], 
pp. 160–61), but the intersection between gender and class in the workplace is even less tractable to 
remediation. Although women might be moving into managerial positions in small numbers, the 
preponderance of support staff, clerks and care providers are still primarily women, but no legislature 
has been brave enough to tackle the intersection of gender and class. Indeed, class itself is ineffable 
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within anti-discrimination legislation because neoliberalism through its privileging of corporate power, 
capital accumulation and competition fosters inequality, not equality. 
Although bypassing the conundrum posed by class, multiple reports and recommendations have 
sought to overhaul the SDA throughout its lifespan, but only minor changes have been accepted and 
implemented. First, in 1992, the House of Representatives Legal and Constitutional Committee reviewed 
and proposed a number of changes to improve the effectiveness of the SDA [104], such as the inclusion 
of potential pregnancy and family responsibilities as operable grounds, as well as changes to the 
definition of indirect discrimination. Secondly, the idea of an Equality Act that would have binding force 
was seriously raised in 1994 in the context of a comprehensive Law Reform Commission Report on 
women’s equality [105], but it was not acted upon. It is notable that there was a division among the 
commissioners as to whether the Equality Act should be gender neutral or for the benefit of women  
only [106]. Even then, the proposed Equality Act or Acts did not transcend the negative duties approach 
associated with anti-discrimination legislation at that time ([107], p. 201). Thirdly, in 2008 the Senate 
directed the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs to inquire into and report on the 
effectiveness of the SDA [108]. The committee recommended that numerous changes to the Act be 
considered in addition to reviving the idea of a single Equality Act. As a result of this inquiry, breastfeeding 
was included as a new ground, but other recommendations were deferred. Fourthly, a national charter of 
human rights was proposed in 2009 after an extensive Australia-wide consultation [109]. The report 
proposed the enactment of a federal human rights Act based on the major international human rights 
treaties, but that proposal was also shelved. Instead, in 2010, the federal government announced the fifth 
major initiative, which was the consolidation and reform of the separate Commonwealth anti-discrimination 
laws relating to race, sex, disability and age. 
What is notable about the announcement of the consolidation project in light of the neoliberal turn is 
that it was issued in the form of a joint press release from the then Attorney-General and the Minister 
for Finance and Deregulation, a new portfolio, thereby signifying the economically rationalist origins of 
the project [110]. Despite extensive public consultation, however, the consolidation project was 
abandoned by the Gillard Labor Government in 2013. Pressure arose largely from employer groups to 
reduce regulation and “red tape”, a recurring theme so far as employer groups and conservative politicians 
were concerned, as already mentioned in relation to AA. In addition, in what might be regarded as a 
textbook example of the ressentiment of the right, the exposure draft of the bill was trenchantly attacked 
for constraining freedom, particularly freedom of speech. The attack was triggered by the application of 
the vilification provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act to a case involving a journalist who was 
found to have engaged in conduct reasonably likely “to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” a group 
of fair-skinned Aboriginal people [111]. The only reform to emerge from the protracted consolidation 
effort was the 2013 amendment to the SDA proscribing discrimination in respect of sexual orientation, 
gender identity and intersex status. 
Soon after the collapse of the consolidation project, a conservative Coalition government was once 
more elected, which put paid to any immediate prospect of reform. What counted now was freedom, in 
all its manifestations, including freedom from regulation; equality was dispensable. Indeed, the 
Attorney-General, Senator the Hon. George Brandis QC, had made it clear prior to assuming office in 
2013 that he intended to shift the focus of the AHRC away from discrimination towards traditional rights 
and freedoms, including freedom of speech, despite the fact that the administration of the anti-discrimination 
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Acts was the primary function of the AHRC as specified in the enabling legislation, the AHRC Act itself. 
Indeed, in order to implement the new agenda, Senator Brandis appointed a Human Rights Commissioner 
for the express purpose of promoting rights and freedoms. As a result, the new commissioner was dubbed 
the “Freedom Commissioner”. Furthermore, the Australian Law Reform Commission was enjoined to 
conduct a thoroughgoing inquiry into the question of possible encroachment by Commonwealth laws on 
traditional rights and freedoms [112]. 
To recapitulate, the grounds of potential pregnancy, family responsibilities, breast feeding, sexual 
orientation, gender identity and intersex were all included as new grounds within the SDA over the last 
two decades. However, the ongoing efforts of feminist activists to move from a formalistic to a substantive 
understanding of equality and their protracted efforts to modernise and reform human rights and  
anti-discrimination legislation have come to naught despite the proliferation of reports and 
recommendations. The resistance to change clearly illustrates the way that neoliberalism has veered 
away from equality and the correlative values associated with social justice in favour of individual freedom, 
entrepreneurialism and capital accumulation. 
7. Conclusions 
In this overview of the recent trajectory of sex discrimination legislation in Australia, I have sought 
to show how the fortunes of women in the world of work, continue to be contingent not only on the good 
graces of men, as has always been the case, but also on the dominant political ideology of the moment. 
This is particularly marked in the swing from social liberalism to neoliberalism. I am not asserting that 
there is a clear line of demarcation between these two incarnations of liberalism, for progressives and 
conservatives necessarily coexist, whichever party is in power. Most legislation withstands changes in 
government, as can be seen from the example of the SDA. However, the efficacy of legislation can be 
undermined by withdrawing funding or by appointing personnel designed to effect a particular agenda, 
as with the creation of new positions, such as the “Freedom Commissioner”. Judges continue with their 
interpretative role, although the subjectivity of a particular judge can exercise a marked effect on the 
outcome of a particular case. Judges, after all, are appointed by the government of the day in accordance 
with the Anglo-Australian tradition, which is necessarily going to favour a particular political ideology. 
Institutional changes are often subtle and ad hoc, but a pattern is clearly discernible when viewed through 
a longitudinal lens. The picture is nevertheless blurred by positive initiatives such as the legislative 
proscription of discrimination on new grounds, such as sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex, 
and the significant increase in damages for sexual harassment. 
Sex discrimination legislation was enacted at the height of social liberalism and provided an avenue 
of complaint for those alleging less favourable treatment on the ground of sex, or a cognate facet of 
identity, but is dependent on a heroic complainant having to carry the burden of proof at a formal hearing, 
often against a powerful corporation or a government entity. The many attempts by feminists and 
progressive law reformers to enhance the efficacy of the legislation over more than two decades foundered. 
The High Court decision of Banovic [38] encouraged women to view sex discrimination legislation 
as beneficent and purposive. The swing in favour of neoliberalism accompanied something of a shift in 
judicial interpretation at the appellate level away from the equality and social justice aims of the 
legislation in favour of a more positivistic and technocratic interpretation that favours corporate 
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respondents. Former High Court judge, Michael Kirby (1996–2009), who consistently found himself in 
dissent in discrimination cases that dealt with disability and sexuality, as well as sex, rued the retreat. 
He was highly critical of the narrow, technocratic approach favoured by the Court from the late 1990s, 
which by the time of Amery (2006) [44] had crystallised into what he refers to as “hostile litigious 
environment” ([44], p. 219). This has had the effect of heightening the burden of proof for complainants and 
deterring them from proceeding to a formal hearing, particularly in view of the prospect of onerous costs. 
Sex discrimination legislation is incapable of tackling the structures of the workplace, many of which 
emanate from the industrial relations system, which is largely treated as discrete, thereby causing an 
uneasy relationship between the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the SDA [113], despite the adverse action 
innovation. In recognition of the fact that the individual complaint-based mechanism is not an efficacious 
way of bringing about social change, AA legislation was enacted to lessen the burden on the individual 
complainant. However, the AAA and its two successor Acts, the EOWWA and the WGEA, were 
vociferously attacked and watered down, albeit that the original AAA was practically devoid of 
substance and overly deferential towards employers. 
This overview of the 30-year trajectory of sex discrimination legislation has shown that the struggle 
for substantive gender equality is ongoing. While the liberal progressivist thesis may be that we are 
always coming closer to an ideal end state of gender equality, this is a myth. The ideological shifts and 
turns within the political realm create an arena of perennial contestation. The Australian Labor Party, as 
well as the Liberal Party, is supportive of neoliberal policies, such as deregulation, despite Labor’s 
traditional association with social justice and progressive policies. As Purcell points out: “Neoliberalization 
is an incomplete process that struggles with internal contradictions, manifests its agenda unevenly, and 
produces unintended consequences” ([13], p. 31). At present, there is no obvious wholesale sign of rejection 
in sight for neoliberalism. Even more alarming is the possibility of a far-right alternative ([114], p. 333). 
This volatility in the political firmament means that women’s struggle for equality in the public sphere 
is necessarily a work in progress. 
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